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Evolving Patent Legislation Growing Pains
Eric Carr*
I. INTRODUCTION
Erich Spangenberg and his Dallas-based company, IPNav, represent the
interests of innovators., IPNav, a nonpracticing entity, has sued more than
any other entity in the patent field. Asserting the property rights of patentees
against more than 1,600 companies requires Spangenberg to transform into a
carefully modulated menace. 2 Companies resistant to diplomatic conversa-
tions may make Spangenberg, as he puts it, "go thug."3 However, "[o]nce
you go thug, though, you can't unthug. Actually, you can unthug, but if you
do that, you can't rethug. Then you just seem crazy."4 Whether you thug or
not, companies like IPNav drive the important secondary patent market.
The secondary patent market acts as a catalyst for redistributing wealth
from businesses using, making, selling, offering to sell, or importing an in-
vention. The entire U.S. economy relies on some form of Intellectual Prop-
erty (IP).5 IP-intensive industries directly accounted for 27.1 million
American jobs and 18.8% of all employment in 2010.6 W-intensive industries
accounted for $5.06 trillion in value added and 34.8% of U.S. gross domestic
product in 2010.7 Legislation must not hastily change the patent system be-
cause so much is at stake.
Nonpracticing entities are undisputedly causing much of the ruckus in
recent patent legislation. Understanding the two predominant views of non-
practicing entities is important for drafting proper legislation. The first view
is that nonpracticing entities provide small to medium-sized patent holders
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1. See David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y.






5. ECONOMIC AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION AND UNITED STATES PATENT AND
TRADEMARK OFFICE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE U.S. ECONOMY: IN-
DUSTRIES IN FOCUS (Mar. 2012).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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the opportunity to be compensated for their patent rights.8 Nonpracticing en-
tities allow patentees to avoid the prohibitively high cost of patent litigation.9
Nonpracticing entities team up with contingent-fee lawyers to assert patent
rights and collect money for patentees with limited resources, including uni-
versities.1O The second view is that nonpracticing entities serve no useful
purpose and take advantage of opportunities in the patent system."] In this
view nonpracticing entities take advantage of the patent system by any means
to make a quick buck.
The patent system has failed to control the range of actions a nonprac-
ticing entity can take. Unreasonably expansive actions by nonpracticing enti-
ties have produced much angst in the patent system. The high transaction
cost of patent litigation has led to an increasing number of "threat of litiga-
tion" lawsuits. Within the patent realm, these lawsuits generally involve one
party asserting the rights of a patent, whether or not the rights are legiti-
mately infringing. In these lawsuits the Plaintiff's primary goal is to get the
Defendant to settle because the cost of litigation is so great. Nonpracticing
entities may assert marginal patents or take overly expansive claim construc-
tions to unfairly extract money from those practicing the invention.
Lessening transaction costs of litigation must occur to optimize the pat-
ent system. The direct waste of legal resources, inordinate discovery require-
ments, and inefficiencies drive up the cost of litigation and provide greater
leverage to those who want a quick settlement. Unfortunately, bridging tech-
nology and the law carries high transaction costs.
Developing new laws that remedy past problems while forging a more
robust patent system is vital to protecting intangible assets and fostering in-
novation. Patent quality must be improved. Sadly, patents covering inven-
tions for a crustless peanut butter and jelly sandwich and a method of
exercising a housecat with a laser pointer exist.12 Both inventor's rights and
patent quality must be considered in upcoming legislation for the future of
the patent system. This article will address current trends in the patent system
regarding its legal history, the current state of the law, and possible directions
they may take, with a focus on the seemingly inevitable promulgation of the
Innovation Act.
8. David Schwartz & Jay Kesan, Analyzing the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in
the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 428 (2014).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 459
(2012).
12. U.S. Patent No. 5,443,036 (filed Nov. 2, 19935); U.S. Patent No. 6,004,596
(filed Dec. 8, 1997).
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Forty years ago, less than one in twenty patent trials were in front of a
jury.13 Modem patent litigation almost always involves a jury trial because a
jury provides more favorable rulings for patentees than judges. 14 Further-
more, jurors are reluctant to invalidate patents issued by the United States
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).15 More importantly, preparation for a
jury trial increases both the cost of patent litigation and the willingness to
settle.16 Patent validity jury trials are deciding questions of law; however,
traditionally, juries decide fact questions.17 The Supreme Court reiterated this
in Microsoft Corp. v. i4i LLC.18 Further, the interpretation of the terms is an
issue for the judge, and it is the court's duty to resolve fundamental disputes
regarding the scope of a claim.19
Term interpretation by juries has led to enormous settlements, greatly
increasing activity in the secondary patent market. For example, a federal
jury led Research in Motion to settle for $612,500,000 because the use of the
Blackberry infringed on patent rights.20 In the 1960s and 1970s, patents could
be ignored more easily because courts would often invalidate patents on the
grounds of obviousness when a patent infringement action took place.21 Fo-
rum shopping was rampant because litigators wanted their suits to be tried in
specific regional circuits based on the circuits' disposition of patent rights.22
In 1982, Congress moved toward clarifying and stabilizing patent laws by
creating the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.23 Around the same
13. Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patents are Valid? 1674 (Stanford




17. See generally Eileen M. Herlihy, Appellate Review of Patent Claim Construc-
tion: Should the Federal Circuit Be Its Own Lexicographer in Matters Related
to the Seventh Amendment?, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 469, 498
(2009).
18. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S.Ct. 2238, 2242-43 (2011) (the Court
stated that "the ultimate question of patent validity is one of law" (quoting
Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1 (1966)).
19. 02 Micro Int'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation Tech. Co., 521 F.3d 1351, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[w]hen the parties present a fundamental dispute regarding
the scope of a claim term, it is the court's duty to resolve it.").
20. Martin E. Hsia, Technological Revolution and Patent Law Evolution (or Devo-
lution?): The Recent Weakening of Patents, 14 HAw. B.J. 117, 119 (2011).
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time, Texas Instruments Inc. started to aggressively assert its patents. 24 This
brought recognition to the revenue generation potential of patents. 25 The Fed-
eral Circuit provided a "pro patent" environment that allowed patentees to
actualize the equity of their patents into the twenty-first century. 26
This "pro patent" atmosphere created a rise in filing of patent applica-
tions. Utility patents granted by the PTO have increased for the fourth con-
secutive year.27 Over a quarter-million patents were issued in 2013 by the
PTO.28 Indeed, nonpracticing entities encourage higher volumes of patent ap-
plications because over $30 billion in settlement and licensing fees were col-
lected last year.29 This figure is trending upward rapidly and has increased
fourfold in the past decade.30 The secondary patent market continues to ex-
pand, despite recent Supreme Court decisions that reversed the Federal Cir-
cuit in a manner inconsistent with the recent "pro patent" trend.
In eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., the Supreme Court made permanent
injunctions more difficult for patentees to obtain.31 Permanent injunctions
were issued to patent infringers absent "exceptional circumstances."32 The
Court held that in seeking a permanent injunction, "a plaintiff must demon-
strate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies availa-
ble at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that
injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff
and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public inter-
est would not be disserved by a permanent injunction."33 The Court relied
heavily on Section 283 of Title 35, which allows courts to grant injunctions
"in accordance with the principles of equity to prevent the violation of any
right secured by patent, on such terms as the court deems reasonable."34 The
24. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION COULD
HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY 34 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/
assets/660/657103.pdf.
25. See id.
26. See generally id.
27. U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PATENT TECH. MONITORING TEAM, U.S.
PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARS 1963-2013, http://www.uspto
.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us-stat.htm (last modified Jul. 24, 2014)).
28. Id.
29. Joel B. Carter, Responding to a Patent Troll's Threats, ARKANSAS LAWYER,
Summer 2013, at 30.
30. Id.
31. See eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 397 (2006).
32. Id. at 388.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 392.
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Court reasoned that equitable discretion over injunctions is allowed to adapt
to the rapid technological and legal developments in the patent system. 35
The decision in eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C. is extremely important
because it exemplifies important issues underlying problems with patents.
When the Court concluded that equitable discretion was allowed, Justice
Kennedy noted "the potential vagueness and suspect validity of some of
these patents may affect the calculus under the four-factor test."36 Claim
scope uncertainty relates to the potential vagueness and remains a major is-
sue in the patent system. The Court noted "that a 'plaintiff's willingness to
license its patents' and 'its lack of commercial activity in practicing patents'
would be sufficient to establish that the patentee would not suffer irreparable
harm" under the four-factor test.37 This case is clearly not "pro patent" be-
cause permanent injunctions were a fundamental right to patent owners' ex-
clusive rights to make, use, and sell their inventions.38
In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., the Supreme Court decided
upon principle to decide whether a patent claiming a combination of ele-
ments was obvious.39 The Court found that if a person of ordinary skill in the
art could implement a variation, then patentability would be barred.40 Simi-
larly, if an improvement or technique used on a device would be recogniza-
ble to a person of ordinary skill in the art, obviousness would bar
patentability.41 This view of obviousness modified the existing requirement
that "demonstrating a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to combine known
elements" would show obviousness.42 The Court stated that using the ex-
isting requirement was flawed because of its narrowness when applied to an
obviousness inquiry.43 Broadening the principles behind obviousness deter-
minations is obviously not "pro patent."
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court abrogated
the Federal Circuit rule that prevented a patent licensee from filing a declara-
tory judgment when a current license existed. 44 The Court held that under
Article III, the licensee had the right to seek a declaratory judgment based on
invalidity or no infringement of the underlying patent.4 5 Allowing a licensee
35. Id. at 397.
36. See eBay, 547 U.S. at 397.
37. Id. at 393.
38. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2012).
39. KSR Int'l, Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 417 (2007).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 418.
43. Id. at 419.
44. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 128-29 (2007).
45. Id. at 137.
2014]
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to challenge a patent when a license has already been taken is not "pro
patent."
In Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc., the Supreme Court
ruled that the authorized sale of an article that embodies a patent exhausts the
patentee's rights to recover future sales use of the article.46 The patents in this
case, disclosed processes commonly found in electronics. For example, one
patent covered a method of organizing read and write requests to memory
that allowed for execution of outstanding write requests.47 LG Electronics
argued that because the patents are linked to a process, the use of that process
infringes patent rights.48 Under this theory patent exhaustion would not occur
through sale of an article because practicing the patent would still infringe.49
The Court found this theory to be dangerous because any downstream pur-
chasers using the process could be liable for patent infringement.50 Taking
away patentees' opportunity to collect rent from downstream purchasers in
process patents is not "pro patent." In 2010, Bilski v. Kappos lessened the
importance of the "machine-or-transformation" test.5 ' This test was key for
granting business method patents and helped the Federal Circuit determine
the patentability of a process. 52 The Supreme Court ruled that test was a
"useful and important clue" for determining patentability, but not the "sole
test."53 The Court noted that vagueness within business method patents in-
vites a "pernicious use of patents" that has long been criticized.54 Quoting the
1883 decision in Atlantic Works, the Court explained that patent laws are not
intended to "creat[e] a class of speculative schemers who make it their busi-
ness to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its foam in the
form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon the
industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advance-
ment of the arts."55 Ironically, 131 years later, a class of speculative schemers
has been created, known as "patent trolls."
Joel B. Carter, Associate at Quatdebaum, Grooms Tull & Burrow, has
classified patent trolls as one of three types: inside patent trolls, heat seeking
patent trolls, and trolling patent trolls.56 An "inside patent troll" works with
46. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elec. Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008).
47. Id. at 622.
48. Id. at 628.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 630.
51. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3259 (2010).
52. See generally id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 3256.
55. Id.
56. Carter, supra note 29.
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an entity that practices the inventions disclosed in its patents.57 "Heat seek-
ing" patent trolls actively seek potential infringers and acquire patents
through any means available.58 "Trolling" patent trolls assert weak patents
accompanied by drafts of complaints in front of a large number of targets to
fish for anyone who will agree to license.59 "Trolling" patent trolls are caus-
ing much of the commotion leading to patent reformation in 2014.
Although no clear definition of "patent troll" exists, one's definition of
patent troll depends on perspective.60 Peter Detkin, former Vice President of
Intel, used to use the term "patent extortionists" until Intel was sued for libel,
so he came up with the term "patent troll."61 Detkin defined the term as
someone "who tries to make a lot of money off a patent that they are not
practicing and have no intention of practicing and in most cases never prac-
ticed."62 Detkin is now the Co-Founder of Intellectual Ventures.63 On NPR's
program This American Life, a Silicon Valley venture capitalist compared
Intellectual Ventures' patent licensing program to "a mafia style shake-
down."64 Detkin responded to this assertion, calling it "ridiculous and offen-
sive."65 Intellectual Ventures position is that it provides an efficient solution
for patent holders to get paid because inventors have a right to recognize a
return on their investments of time, money, and emotional resources into
ideas.66
Regardless of perspective, "patent troll" is a pejorative term for a non-
practicing entity. These nonpracticing entities almost always include univer-
sities, research institutes, government agencies, corporate research and
development labs, individual inventors, and non-core businesses.67 Research




60. See generally Brenda Sandburg, You May Not Have a Choice. Trolling for




63. Todd Bishop, Intellectual Ventures Responds to This American Life Expose :






67. Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297,
327 (2011).
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ment.68 Inversely, nonpracticing entities primarily use patents to collect li-
cense fees and do not fund technology development.69 As a company's
business evolves, the categorization of nonpracticing entities may change.70
Figure 1 shows an example of one such business evolution.71
































With the PTO outputting higher numbers of patents each year, multiple
ownership stakes in the same technology has created the "patent thickets"
problem.72 Patent thickets is a form of "tragedy of the anticommons," by
which people underuse scarce resources because of overlapping ownership.73
This defensive use of patent portfolios in the corporate setting has allowed
the patent thickets to grow.74 These thickets create the subsequent need to
invent around patents and can stifle innovation.75 Generally, nonpracticing
entities are immune from the effects of defensive patenting because they do




71. Id. at 325.
72. U.S.PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 27.
73. J. McDonough, The Myth of the Patent Troll: An Alternative View Of the Func-
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cused infringer creates no countersuit threat.77 Further, nonpracticing entities
amplify the patent thickets problem because they can be more fearless in
asserting patents.78
TiVo identifies the distinct quality that separates them from nonpractic-
ing entities; TiVo actually makes and sells things.79 TiVo complains that
nonpracticing entities such as Rambus, Intellectual Ventures, and'Acacia can
assert patent rights all day long without ever being countersued.80 According
to TiVo, nonpractincing entities can "simply roll the dice, shrug their shoul-
ders at the occasional setback, and keep betting until they hit a big payday."81
Astudy from the Boston University School of Law found that the average
loss to a company's stock following a patent suit between 1990 and 2010 was
$122 million.82 The study claimed that patent trolls may have cost United
States businesses as much as $500 billion in stock value over this twenty-
year period.83
Whatever the effect of patents on the economy is, it is important to
understand the driving force for new patent legislation. Powerful companies
are the largest targets of patent suits, and powerful companies have the great-
est effect on Congress. Nonpracticing entities are disrupting powerful com-
panies and Congress is geared toward protecting them.84 "It's all part and
parcel of the same system, whether we're talking about food libel laws, pat-
ent-trolling, internet censorship . . . the law is increasingly tilted against the
individual and against freedom."85 New legislation must not limit the rights
of inventors to an extent that would render the patent system broken. How-
ever, 68% of all the patent infringement lawsuits from 2007 to 2011 were
brought by an operating company. 86
From 2007 to 2011, almost one-third of patent infringement lawsuits
were filed in three of the ninety-four federal district courts: the Eastern Dis-
77. Id.
78. Id.





82. K. Aziz, Patent Trolls Cost US Economy Half a Trillion Dollars Says Study,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MAG. (Sept. 21, 2011).
83. Id.
84. Erik Kain, SOPA, the NDAA, and Patent-Trolling: Why Americans Need a
Civil Liberties Caucus, FORBES (Dec. 10, 2011), http://www.forbes.comlsites/
erikkain/2011 / 12/1 0/sopa-the-ndaa-and-patent-trolling-why-americans-need-a-
civil-liberties-caucus/.
85. Id.
86. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 24, at 17.
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trict of Texas, the District of Delaware, and the Central District of Califor-
nia.87 This shows that patentees are driven to districts favoring patent owners
because of "quicker trials, higher success rates, and higher damage awards
for patent owners."88 Many recent patent infringement lawsuits arise from
three key factors: "(1) unclear and overly broad patents, (2) the potential for
disproportionately large damage awards, and (3) the increasing recognition
that patents are a valuable asset."89
A majority bipartisan vote of 325-91 in December of 2013 vaulted the
Innovation Act into the spotlight of patent reform in the United States.90
Other patent reform legislation includes the Demand Letter Transparency
Act, the Patent Litigation Integrity Act, the SHIELD Act, the Patent Quality
Improvement Act, the STOP Act, the End Anonymous Patents Act, and the
Patent Abuse Reduction Act. The Innovation Act aims to further limit rights
of patentees and to investigate issues that Congress finds of particular impor-
tance. The Bill contains provisions that will substantially impact the enforce-
ment, procurement, and ownership of patents. The Innovation Act is
discussed alongside the current law because its promulgation is inevitable.
Subsequent sections delve into analysis, suggestions, and possible solutions.
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Patent infringement cases begin when a party files a complaint in fed-
eral court. Federal courts follow a "notice pleading" standard that requires
little information. The Supreme Court, in Twombly and Iqbal, raised this
standard, which now requires a plaintiff to recite sufficient facts in the com-
plaint to make the case plausible, which requires showing that liability is
more probable than merely possible.91 Twombly and Iqbal aid in filtering
meritless cases that rely on the threat of litigation to reach undeserved settle-
ments.92 However, a five sentence standard patent complaint, known as Form
18, provides a loophole through which a threadbare complaint provides suffi-
cient pleading.
Form 18 provides enough information to satisfy plausibility, which sat-
isfies the "short and plain" statement of the plaintiff.93 Federal Rules of Civil
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id. at 25.
89. Id. at 28.
90. See Jennifer A. Albert & April Weisbruch, The Year Ahead in Patent Law,
GOODWIN PROCTER LLP (Jan. 9, 2014), http://www.goodwinprocter.com/Publi
cations/Newsletters/IP-Alert/2014/0108_The-Year-Ahead-in-Patent-Law.aspx.
91. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
92. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556
U.S. 662 (2009).
93. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
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Procedure Rule 84 states: "the forms in the Appendix suffice under these
rules and illustrate the simplicity and brevity that these rules contemplate." 94
Form 18 is a template for a patent infringement pleading that contains:
(1) an allegation of jurisdiction; (2) a statement that the plaintiff
owns the patent; (3) a statement that defendant has been infringing
the patent 'by making, selling, and using [the device] embodying
the patent'; (4) a statement that the plaintiff has given the defen-
dant notice of its infringement; and (5) a demand for an injunction
and damages."95 In K-Tech v. Time Warner, K-Tech used Form 18
to state that Time Warner Cable was infringing "by making, sell-
ing, and using methods or systems embodying the patent. 96
The court did not read Form 18 to require a plaintiff to identify an accused
device by name. 97 The Federal Circuit found that K-Tech used Form 18 prop-
erly, therefore, satisfyingied the pleading standards. 98
The Innovation Act would further heighten the pleading requirement for
patent infringement cases. Each element of each claim asserted would require
"detailed specificity" within a clear and concise statement as to how each
limitation is met by the accused instrumentality.99
The court in "exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to
the prevailing party."100 This is the current law for awarding attorney's fees
in patent cases. A litigation claim or argument must be deemed objectively
baseless to award attorney's fees under this law.101 Objective baselessness
requires the claim or argument to be "so unreasonable that no reasonable
litigant could believe it would succeed."102 However, absent clear and con-
vincing evidence of an objective baseless claim, fees can be awarded when a
party engages in litigation misconduct. 103 Misconduct during patent litigation
has led to eight-figure awards for attorney's fees in recent cases. 104
94. Fed. R. Civ. P. 84.
95. K-Tech Telecomm., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1283
(Fed. Cir. 2013).
96. Id. at 1285.
97. Id. at 1286.
98. Id. at 1287.
99. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 281A(a)(5)(B) (2013).
100. 35 U.S.C. § 285 (2012).
101. Old Reliable Wholesale, Inc. v. Cornell Corp., 635 F.3d 539, 544 (Fed. Cir.
2011).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 549.
104. Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549 F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (awarding $16,800.80 in fees).
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The Act would allow for the recovery of reasonable fees incurred by a
prevailing party in a patent suit "unless the court finds that the position and
conduct of the nonprevailing party or parties were reasonably justified in law
and fact."105 A nonprevailing party may avoid the fees by showing special
circumstances that make an award unjust.106 For example, severe economic
hardship to a named inventor qualifies as a special circumstance.107
Attorney's fees are not the only major fees incurred in patent litigation;
the cost of discovery in some patent cases is insurmountable. The cost of
making copies of discovery may be taxed as fees.108 The Federal Circuit has
allowed electronic discovery recovery to implicitly derive from the language
of "making copies" under 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4).109 For example, after the
Northern District of Georgia ruled in favor for Cisco on summary judgment
based on non-infringement; Cisco was able to recover the $243,453.02 it had
paid to an electronic discovery company. 010 The court justified the taxation of
these costs hoping that future litigants will exercise restraint in burdening
parties with unlimited demands for electronic discovery.I
Discovery for patent cases does not exclusively take place within the
Federal Circuit. The PTO conducts both inter partes and post grant reviews,
which may require discovery. Discovery in post grant reviews is limited to
evidence "directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in the
proceeding."'12 Discovery is more limited in inter partes review, where dep-
ositions and "what is otherwise necessary in the interests of justice" is al-
lowed.113 Five factors are considered when determining if the "necessary in
the interest of justice" standard is met under 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5).14 These
factors include: (1) more than a possibility of finding something "favorable
in substantive value to a contention of the party moving for discovery"; (2)
"Asking for the other party's litigation positions and the underlying basis for
those positions is not necessary in the interest of justice"; (3) "Information a
party can reasonably figure out or assemble without a discovery request
would not be in the interest of justice to have produced by the other party";
(4) requests must be easily understood; (5) requests must not be overly bur-
105. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 285(a) (2013).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1920(4) (2012).
109. CBT Flint Partners v. Return Path, Inc., 737 F.3d 1320, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1325.
112. 37 C.F.R. § 42.224 (2014).
113. Id. § 42.51(b)(2).
114. See Garmin Int'l, Inc. v. Cuozzo Speed Tech., LLC, 2013 WL 2023626, *6-7
(P.T.A.B. Mar. 5, 2013).
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densome to answer." 5 However, interference practice allows one to obtain
more evidence since the Federal Rules of Evidence apply rather than the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The Innovation Act would require the Judicial Conference of the United
States to develop rules and procedures that address the "asymmetries in dis-
covery burdens and costs."116 Additionally, electronic discovery requests
must be specific and would not be allowed for general "information relating
to a product or business."17 Some asymmetries in discovery derive from
suits by nonpracticing entities that conceal entities with an interest in the
patent rights. Patent law may be improved by requiring public disclosure of
all relevant interests.
House Bill 3540 introduced the Demand Letter Transparency Act of
2013 to address egregious threats of litigation that operate as unfair competi-
tion.118 The Act requires that any entity sending twenty or more demand let-
ters during any one-year-period to submit a disclosure to the PTO.119 The
entity must identify and confirm that it owns the patent and has the rights to
license the patent. 20 Failure to comply with this requirement would subject
the entity to monetary sanctions to cover the reasonable costs of the adverse
party.' 2' A demand letter database would have to be created after consulta-
tion with the Attorney General and Federal Trade Commission.122 The Act
would require the demand letter to identify each accused infringing instru-
mentality as it relates to each claim in the asserted patent. 23 Similar to the
Innovation Act, it would require showing how each claim corresponds to the
functionality of the accused instrumentality with "detailed specificity."24
The Innovation Act would require that the plaintiff's initial disclosure
include: assignee; any entity with rights to license or enforce; any entity with
a financial interest; and the ultimate parent entity.125 Ultimate parent entity is
"an entity which is not controlled by any other entity."26 Additionally, the
PTO has proposed a new set of rules for patent assignment recordation. In a
115. Id.
116. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 6(a)(1) (2013).
117. Id. at § 6(a)(2)(B)(i) (2013).
118. See generally Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3540, 113th
Cong. (2013).




123. Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3540.
124. Id. § 264(a)(5)(C).
125. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 4(b)(1) (2013).
126. 16 C.F.R. § 801.1(a)(3) (2014).
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push by the PTO to provide greater transparency, the proposed rules require
information regarding patentees because some patentees have been hiding
their identity to leverage bargaining power with nonpracticing entities.127
Greater transparency is important to modernize patent examination and im-
prove patent quality.128 One reason to release information regarding who
owns patent rights is to identify beneficial owners within complex corporate
structures and licenses.129 The information will be required upon recordation
and will be applied retroactively to all patents with a proposed penalty of
abandonment.30 This would particularly help consumers of manufacturers
who are sued for infringement by readily identifying exactly who is suing
them.
The Act would require the stay of any patent infringement action against
a customer when the manufacturer is involved in an action related to the
same patent.1 31 Consumers would also have a clear right to stay actions
against them in which the manufacturer has a similar action against them.
However, the manufacturer and customer must consent to the stay and the
customer must agree to be bound by any final decisions.132 Mutual consent
would provide greater protection to consumers of goods and services that are
patented and where a patentee may seek to target the profits of a consumer
over that of a manufacturer.
Consumers are easy targets for quick settlements and are generally un-
educated about the nuances of patent law. The Act improves information
transparency by creating a user-friendly website to notify the public of patent
cases brought in federal court. 133 Educational resources regarding patent in-
fringement and abusive patent litigation practices will be developed for small
businesses.34 These may be short- term remedies for the growing pains of
the patent system, but Section 8 of the Act provides the initiative to develop a
more effective patent system.
Section 8, Studies on Patent Transactions, Quality, and Examination,
asks the PTO to research pressing issues and develop legislative recommen-
dations while examining economic impacts of the secondary patent mar-
ket.135 The Act requires a study on: Impact of Legislation on Ability of
Individuals and Small Businesses to Protect Exclusive Rights to Inventions
and Discoveries, Business Method Patent Quality, Demand Letters, Patent




131. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 296(a) (2013).
132. Id.
133. Id. § 7.
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Small Claims Court, Patent Quality and Access to the Best Information Dur-
ing Examination, Patents Owned by the United States Government, and Sec-
ondary Market Oversight for Patent Transactions to Promote Transparency
and Ethical Business Practices.136 The Act requires examining licensing and
generating oversight requirements for the secondary patent market. 137 Specif-
ically, "to ensure that the market is a level playing field and that brokers in
the market have the requisite expertise."138 Further, the Act requires the
Comptroller General of the United States to report on ways to improve patent
quality through technology and other best practices.139
Patent quality requires unambiguous language to develop each element
of a claim. Many recent patent infringement lawsuits involve low-quality pat-
ents.140 Low-quality patents have "unclear property rights, overly broad
claims, or both."141 Claims must be read in view of the specification.142 The
specification may act as a dictionary to construe terms used in the claims.143
Patent prosecution history should also be used as "undisputed public record"
to define claim terms. 144 Extrinsic evidence may help explain scientific prin-
ciples and technical terms. 45 However, intrinsic evidence, such as the speci-
fication, pertains to the manner in which a patent is issued.146 The PTO uses
the specification "as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the
art" to give claims their broadest reasonable construction.47 The specifica-
tion must provide clear support or antecedent basis for the terms and phrases
in the claims.48 Greater accuracy and clarity in the specification will likely
yield higher quality patents.
Accuracy and clarity for patent cases in the Federal Circuit has grown
since Congress established the Patent Pilot Program in 2011.149 The Patent
Pilot Program allows the fifteen district courts with the greatest number of
136. Innovation Act of 2013, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. § 8 (2013).
137. Id. § 8(a)(1)(C).
138. Id.
139. Id. § 8(c).
140. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 24, at 28.
141. Id.
142. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 979 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 980.
145. Id.
146. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Patent Pilot Program Act, Pub. L. No. 111-349, 124 Stat. 3674 (2011).
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patent cases filed to develop greater expertise in patent protection cases.150
The program requires a report analyzing the improved efficiency of the
courts and any evidence that litigants favor certain judicial districts.15, At the
end of the program, Congress will decide if the program should be extended
or made permanent.152 The program also allows for some patent cases to be
transferred based on the enhanced expertise certain courts may have. 153 How-
ever, participation in the Patent Pilot Program is not a dispositive factor when
considering transfer.154
The Patent Pilot Program may provide improvements to the patent sys-
tem when it comes time for claim construction. Patent cases can be won or
lost when the court construes the claims of an asserted patent. Juries are
tasked with applying how the court construes the claims to determine in-
fringement and validity. Juries deciding issues on validity has become the
norm over the past thirty years.155 Further, the jury adds to the uncertainty of
patent litigation, often driving defendants to settle weak cases brought by
patentees. 156
In claim construction, one must not import limitations from specifica-
tions that are not part of the claim.57 Generally, claims are not limited to any
particular embodiment disclosed in the specification, even where only a sin-
gle embodiment is disclosed.158 However, patent owners can add new subject
matter to the patent application by filing continuation applications.59 Al-
though limitations may not be imported from the specification, patent owners
may still form claims via filing a continuation to disrupt the claim construc-
tion notion. This is one of the many nuances of patent law that has compli-
cated litigation and encouraged new legislation.
150. Id. § 1, 124 Stat. at 3675.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 1376.
153. See ESCO Corp. v. Cashman Equipment Co., 2013 WL 4710258, *3 (D. Nev.
2013); see also Lewis v. Grote Industries, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1055-56
(N.D. I11. 2012); Round Rock Research, LLC v. Oracle Corp., 2011 WL
5600363, *9 (E.D. Tex. 2011).
154. See One StockDuq Holdings, LLC v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 2013 WL
1136726, *89 (W.D. Tenn. 2013); see also Caterpillar, Inc. v. ESCO Corp., F.
Supp. 2d, 2012 WL 6618602, *7 (C.D. I11. Dec. 18, 2012); Technology Licens-
ing Corp. v. Harris Corp., 2012 WL 1298611, *24 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
155. Lemley, supra note 13.
156. Id.
157. Deere & Co. v. Bush Hog, 703 F.3d 1349, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
158. Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 111 1,
1117 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
159. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 24.
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On June 4, 2013, executive actions and legislative recommendations
were proposed to decrease frivolous litigation and increase patent quality.160
Legislative recommendations included many of the same topics outlined in
the Innovation Act of 2013, such as disclosing the "Real Party-in-Interest"
and providing greater discretion to award attorney fees.161 Additionally, the
Legislature recommended two major improvements for the ITC. Specifically,
Congress pushed for using the four-factor injunction test in eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange to provide consistency in the ITC and it recommended hiring
more qualified administrative law judges.162 The patent system was strength-
ened through an Executive Order to strengthen the enforcement of exclusion
orders pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1337.163
Conversely, the patent system was weakened through an Executive Or-
der eliminating a patentee's right to exclude downstream users.164 Many non-
practicing entities assert rights of patented software features and patented
business methods against end-users.165 Overly broad functional claiming
within these patented features and methods subjected end-users to lawsuits.
An Executive Order for the PTO to increase scrutiny of functional claims
was announced to improve claim clarity.166 Over 100 companies in an open
letter to Congress criticized these functional claims for halting innovation by
discouraging investment.167
On February 20, 2014, President Obama announced "three new execu-
tive actions to encourage innovation and further strengthen the quality and
accessibility of the patent system."168 First, to improve patent quality the
PTO has begun a new initiative to crowd source prior art searches. 169 Second,
the PTO expanded its Patent Examiner Technical Training Program to help
keep up with fast-changing technologies.170 Third, the PTO will create educa-
160. Press Release, White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Fact Sheet: White
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tional and practical resources to provide pro bono assistance to inventors.171
President Obama encouraged Congress to pass patent legislation to combat
patent trolls.172
President Obama's executive actions play a small role in the bigger pic-
ture of patent law where the Federal Circuit controls. The Federal Circuit
struggles with the dynamic nature of patent law, leaving the Supreme Court
to produce plurality opinions that impact patent practice. For example, the
Federal Circuit has struggled to uniformly analyze patentable subject matter
under 35 U.S.C. § 101.173 In Bilski, the Supreme Court rejected the machine-
or-transformation test used by the Federal Circuit. 174 Although the test is "an
investigative tool" there is no clear method in determining patentable subject
matter.175 The Supreme Court decided to provide more insight on 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 by granting certiorari in Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank Intern.176
Over forty amicus curiae briefs have been filed with the Supreme Court
for the upcoming CLS Bank decision. 177 On March 31, 2014, the Supreme
Court will hear arguments to determine "whether claims to computer-imple-
mented inventions [constitute] patent-eligible subject matter within the
meaning of 35 U.S.C. § 101."178 Briefs from prominent entities such as the
American Intellectual Property Law Association and the Institute of Electri-
cal and Electronics Engineers have weighed in on the issue. 179 Currently,
patent law is in flux as the courts as well as the PTO must balance many
conflicting interests.
IV. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE LAW; FORECAST/RECOMMENDATION
The PTO will soon have satellite offices in Dallas, Denver, Detroit, and
the Silicon Valley.180 With more offices, the PTO's services will allow for
greater public engagement and increased customer satisfaction.181 Michelle
Lee, Director of the PTO, says expanding the PTO's presence "enables the
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Albert, supra note 90.
174. Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3259 (2010).
175. Id.
176. Albert, supra note 90.
177. See Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, SCOTUSBLoG, http://
www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/alice-corporation-pty-ltd-v-cls-bank-inter
national/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2014).
178. Id.
179. Id.
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agency to issue better quality patents."182 Lee supports Congress's current
push to "target abusive patent litigation tactics" and speed up processes sur-
rounding disputes over patent rights.183 Lee plans to work with Commerce
Secretary Penny Pritzker to create an economy more conducive to in-
venting.184 Specifically, Lee plans to find new opportunities to create an agile
patent system that "catalyzes innovation, incentivizes commercial research
and development, and promotes good jobs that support our nation's competi-
tive edge."185
The broader goals of the PTO miss the more effective strategy of identi-
fying and remedying smaller patent issues. For example, jury trials are not
the most cost effective way to try a patent case. Reducing the number of jury
trials may very well result in faster and cheaper resolutions.186 Alternatively,
jury trials could focus on the damages and require infringement and validity
to be tried separately, outside the control of a jury.187 Some patent cases do
not involve a damages trial, so a jury trial would be unnecessary, saving even
more time and money. 188 Bifurcation would allow parties to focus more en-
ergy on the damages phase, possibly producing better damage decisions.189
Legislation from Congress and other top-down approaches to fixing the
patent system may be combined with bottom-up approaches. Professor Xuan-
Thao Nguyen' 90 believes "[i]t is time to embrace a spirit of dynamic federal-
ism by acknowledging and encouraging innovative reform at the local level,
thereby solving, in part, a national problem."19, Instead, Congress has dis-
couraged the judges who are central to patent reform from thinking outside-
the-box. 192 Unfortunately, this has resulted in isolationism among judges and
bar associations. In reality there have been "successful results from judges
and local bar associations working together to control patent litigation, curb









190. Professor Xuan-Thao Nguyen teaches Intellectual Property Licensing at the
Southern Methodist University and is an expert in the Taxation of Intellectual
Property matters. She is joining Indiana University in August 2014 and will
lead the Center for Intellectual Property Law and Innovation at the 1U Robert
H. McKinney School of Law.
191. See Xuan-Thao Nguyen, Dynamic Federalism and Patent Law Reform, 85 IND.
L.J. 449, 452 (2010).
192. Id. at 489.
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pertise in patent cases."' 193 Innovation needs local patent reform to properly
overhaul the patent system.194
The PTO must continuously work to improve the patent system to foster
innovation. The PTO should do its best to create a reputation for an effective
and efficient inventing economy. Bad policy and publicity will only stifle the
public's trust in innovation. For example, the PTO should avoid well publi-
cized conflicts. For instance, Gilbert Hyatt has over seventy patents issued
with the PTO.'95 However, Mr. Hyatt is currently suing the PTO because,
allegedly, it has left two patent applications pending for over forty years.196
Whether or not the PTO is at fault, there is no logical reason for pendency of
a patent application to eclipse four decades.
Pendency has dropped in recent years because of greater application
allowance rates by the PTO. 197 Additionally, research studies through the In-
tellectual Property Institute have shown continuing applications and refiled
continuing applications have accounted for the filing increase at the PTO.198
Approximately 20,000 continuing applications were filed in 1998, compared
to almost 90,000 continuing applications filed in 2007.199 Filing continua-
tions allows a patentee to have "multiple bites at the apple" while maintain-
ing the priority date of the original disclosure.
Filing continuations are a valuable tool in litigation, especially where
the claims of an issued patent do not necessarily fit the accused instrumental-
ities, but the disclosure scope of the issued patent allows for such claims to
be introduced through a continuing application to better fit the accused in-
strumentalities. Patent prosecutors may advise clients to file continuations
before the first-filed patent is allowed, so he or she can extract value from the
scope of the disclosure at the opportune moment. The ability to mold claims
around inventions that exhibit significant market success from a disclosure
given a priority date years before the "inventions" were reduced to practice is
perplexing. One may argue that allowing a patentee to "have his cake and it
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However, strengthening the patent system further may lead to unfore-
seen problems. Foreign inventors can obtain patents in the United States,
offering little advantage to United States inventors over foreign rivals.200 In
fact, foreign rivals are obtaining patents in record numbers because the
United States has the largest economy in the world and foreign investors see
opportunity through the patent system. 201 Nevertheless, lawmakers have
pressed for strengthened patent protection over the last three decades, believ-
ing it will increase U.S. competitiveness.202
Potential accused infringers, not interested in increasing competition,
also want to strengthen the patent system. Specifically, science and technol-
ogy companies believe the PTO lacks the proper access to prior art informa-
tion.203 Microsoft has led a prior art initiative because it has recognized its
interest in patent transparency and quality aligns with the PTO.204 Haracio
Gutierrez, Vice President of Legal and Corporate Affairs at Microsoft, recog-
nized that this "same commitment to transparency and quality has driven our
efforts to make prior art information more easily accessible to the PTO."205
Microsoft currently provides visibility to its more than 37,000 patents
through its Patent Tracker Tool. 206 Microsoft plans to make its prior art ser-
vice with over ten million technical documents available to all patent exam-
iners by May 2014.207 New features and functionalities for prior art searches
allow for greater transparency when prosecuting patents and leads to higher
quality patents.
In theory, the optimal level of patent protection lies where the marginal
cost curve intersects the marginal benefit curve.2 08 Litigants believe the more
200. See William Hubbard, Competitive Patent Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 341, 354
(2013).
201. See U.S.PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, supra note 27.
202. See Keith Bentele & Alexander Ibsen, Exploring the Patent Surge: Increased
Incentives or Multiplying Motives?, 95 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 99,
100 (2013) (stating patent protection has been strengthened over the past three
decades).
203. Pedro Hemandez, Microsoft Voices Support for Patent Reform, Backs White
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money they invest, the better their chances of winning.209 For example, X
may have a skewed incentive because they have more at stake than Y.210 This
skewed incentive on average will yield skewed outcomes. 21' When the true
underlying merits are balanced, the court should recognize and expect that X
will present a better case than y.212 Calibrating the appropriate standard of
proof would require the court to know: "(1) the overall cost of upholding
patents that ought to be invalidated; (2) the cost of invalidating patents that
ought to be held valid ... ; (3) the stakes for each party; and (4) how expend-
itures affect success rates."213 However, these metrics are difficult to accu-
rately assess because an entity challenging patent validity must meet the clear
and convincing evidence standard.214
A unified analysis of the incentives to litigate may prove useful to pat-
ent reform. The Innovation Act would require public recordation of all par-
ties with a beneficial interest in a patent. Public recordation would clarify
true incentives to litigation by readily identifying exactly who is suing them.
An alleged infringer has three options after receiving a demand letter from a
patentee: (1) agree to the terms of the license by the patentee and pay the
appropriate royalty; (2) do nothing and expect to raise validity and infringe-
ment issues as a defense in court; or, (3) file a declaratory judgment. The
incentives of each option should be weighed relative to the probability and
cost of each option.
Assuming that profits of an entity subsequent to a challenge is U, and
profits from licensing as a function of royalty is V(r).215 The difference be-
tween U and V(r) is presumably positive.216 Assuming payoff from losing
litigation is W, and the patentee's stake in litigation is S, accounting for the
infringer's probability of winning and the expected litigation costs will allow
expected outcomes to be modeled for each of the infringer's three options.217
Infringer's probability of winning is denoted as p(U-W, S) and expected liti-
gation costs are denoted as L(U-W, S).218 The infringer can rationally decide
209. Joseph Farell& Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents:
Why Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administra-
tive Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 948 (2004).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 951.
213. Id.
214. See David. L. Schwartz & Christopher B. Seaman, Standards of Proof in Civil
Litigation: An Experiment from Patent Law, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 429, 432
(2013).
215. Farell, supra note 209, at 956.
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 957.
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to take a license if the cost of a license, V(r), exceeds the expected value of
not taking a license, -L(U-W, S) + W + (U-W)p(U-W, S).219
Modeling patent-related decisions in terms of dollars and cents may pro-
vide insight into beneficial changes in the patent system. However, the focus
should not be on making cost-driven decisions, but rather, on what decisions
can be made to reduce transaction costs. After all, the crusade for patent
reform began because of the inordinate cost of patent litigation. Moreover,
the problem with creating a functional model to make decisions in patent
cases is that uncertainty is too high and settlements are too unpredictable.
Most settlement details outside of a patent trial are confidential, keeping
uncertainty in patent cases high. If every company published how much they
paid in royalties or settlements, accurate models could stabilize the secondary
patent market. However, it is this uncertainty that keeps lucrative nonpractic-
ing entities in business. Most companies hedge risk whenever reasonable and
almost every large company hedges risk whenever possible. Therefore, com-
panies will continue to pay to mitigate these risks. In light of the high level of
uncertainty, companies are paying off entities asserting weak or unrelated
patents
If settlement details included the patent numbers asserted, than weak
and unrelated patents could more easily be identified. By identifying weak
and unrelated patents quickly, the patent system would be more efficient.
Companies would better understand the risk associated with the demand let-
ters they receive and could take the appropriate action without paying coun-
sel tens of thousands of dollars simply to investigate the matter. The Demand
Letter Transparency Act of 2013 may further clarify potential patent suits.220
The Act would require that any licensing term or pricing commitments asso-
ciated with an asserted patent be identified.221 Greater transparency within
patent litigation will allow immediate action rather than lengthy investiga-
tion. Uncertainty in patent cases does not begin from the demand letter-it
begins from uncertainty in the scope of patent claims.
Defining claim scope uncertainty may be a solution to improve the qual-
ity of patents. Grouping sources of scope uncertainty, that are difficult to
avoid, and those that can be improved might lower the number of patent
cases that win or lose on claim construction.222 Then, using "perfect scope"
as a hypothetical and theoretical claim, and objectively classify every product
as either infringing or non-infringing.23 But all claims will likely infringe to
some extent. Literal uncertainly scoped claims are those where a significant
219. Id.
220. See Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2013, H.R. 3540, 113th Cong.
§ 264(a)(12) (2013).
221. Id.
222. See Harry Surden, Efficient Uncertainty in Patent Interpretation, 68 WASH &
LEE L. REV. 1737, 1766 (2011).
223. Id. at 1772.
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percentage of relevant products cannot be classified as infringing or non-
infringing.224 The magnitude of legal uncertainty may be related to the
amount of equally reasonable outcomes or options.25 At the very least, mod-
eling legal uncertainty will highlight analogous problems with patent
scope. 226
Classifications based upon claim scope uncertainty may enhance preci-
sion and uniformity within the patent system. For example, the literal in-
fringement doctrine requires juries to proceed through a claim, element by
element.227 Parameters derived from the properties of physical parts and fea-
tures of inventions may be used to identify complete correspondence of a
given claim element.228 Every unique element will represent a classification
rule.229 Scope underdetermination will occur when a claim word has several
distinct interpretations that are plausible.230 Underdetermination may also oc-
cur when words are placed in the specification with the primary purpose to
describe the existing state of the art.23' Although these words were intended
to describe the state of the art, they may import scope limitations detrimental
to interpretation of claim elements.232 By explicitly disambiguating inferred
constraints, patent quality may increase and interpretation disputes may
decrease.
Disambiguating inferred constraints will not be an easy task if the Su-
preme Court continues to develop rules with large magnitudes of uncertainty.
For example, in eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., Justice Kennedy noted that a
"'plaintiff's willingness to license its patents"' and "its lack of commercial
activity in practicing patents" would be sufficient to establish that the patent
holder would not suffer irreparable harm under the four-factor test.233 The
terms "willingness to license" and "lack of commercial activity" have highly
uncertain scopes. When deciding patent cases with such precedential value,
courts need to consider the consequences of making more laws. Maybe Su-
preme Court decisions on patent cases should involve judges from the rele-
vant art unit of the PTO. Perhaps Supreme Court Justices are not as equipped
to analyze patent cases as a PTO judge with decades of experience deciding
patent claim language ambiguities. Astute patent attorneys will now cite Su-
224. Id.
225. Id. at 1769.
226. Id. at 1771.
227. Id. at 1773.
228. See Surden, supra note 222, at 1773.
229. Id. at 1774.
230. Id.
231. Id. at 1778.
232. Id.
233. eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393 (2006).
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preme Court cases like eBay v. MercExchange L.L.C. to clarify auxiliary
ambiguities, only to find enormous uncertainty in the language for the rules.
Patent quality may also increase by adding requirements to the current
patent prosecution process. Claims must particularly point out-and dis-
tinctly claim-the subject matter in the specification.234 Another way to im-
prove patent quality is to add a section in the specification that explicitly
defines all ambiguities with the proper plain definition of each ambiguity..
Patentees will no longer have the option to argue their most favorable defini-
tion when ambiguities arise, or worse, adapt definitions not intended from the
time of conception to allowance. The definition will be permanent and ex-
amined by the PTO, likely reducing the gamesmanship in patent litigation.
The PTO grants exclusive rights to patentees by issuing claims, therefore, it
must clarify ambiguities within claim scope. Fewer ambiguities will create
higher quality patents, less disputes, and stronger inventor's rights.
Ambiguities not addressed by the PTO may be disputed, leaving the
definition of the elements of an invention to claim constructions during liti-
gation. Claim construction is solely a question of law.235 If the Constitution
grants inventors "the exclusive right to their respective writings," why must
additional questions of law arise after the PTO grants a patent?236 Deciding
questions of law multiple times is inefficient. If the PTO only allowed pat-
ents with exceptional clarity, further disputes may diminish.
Exceptional clarity may be achieved by eliminating or narrowing func-
tional claiming in patent applications. This may allow patentees to sue for
infringement over an entire technology when they only have the exclusive
rights to a small improvement of the technology.237 Further, patentees may be
able to claim rights to future technologies that their patent did not intend to
cover.238 Allowing functional claims makes unintentional infringers vulnera-
ble to broad claims. Unintentional infringers are defenseless when sued over
broad functional claims because patent infringement is a strict liability of-
fense.239 Overly broad and vague patent claims produce unclear boundaries,
making it hard to determine the technological scope of a patent.240
Creating bounds for the technological scope of a patent may decrease
the uncertainty in patent infringement lawsuits. Defining a category, or range
of categories, of technological scope upon the issuance of a patent may opti-
mize the patent system. Accused infringers will be able to view the techno-
234. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2012).
235. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 983-84 (Fed. Cir. 1995),
aff'd, 517 U.S. 370 (1996).
236. Const. Art. I § 8, cl. 8.
237. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, supra note 24.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 1.
240. Id. at 30.
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logical scope of patents and make more effective licensing decisions.
Moreover, the quality of a patent may be more easily defined. Quality im-
provements should be made at the PTO. Naturally, the PTO receives large
amounts of criticism for the patent system's performance. Shawn Miller, an
Economics Ph.D. Candidate at George Mason University, analyzed the qual-
ity of patents. 24' Miller estimated 27 percent of patents would have at least
one claim invalidated based on anticipation or obviousness if litigated.242
More importantly, Miller recognized the "relative difficulty PTO exam-
iners face in comparing claimed ideas to the relevant prior art."243 Miller
found that software and business method patents are difficult for examiners
to find relevant prior art, therefore, difficult to reject.244 Inversely, patents
protecting inventions in the medical and energy industries are easier for ex-
aminers to find prior art, thus, easier to reject.245 The availability and ease of
finding relevant prior art will help determine novelty and obviousness at the
examination level. However, the PTO should create new procedures post-
issuance to optimize the patent system.
Creating more demanding administrative procedures with threat of
abandonment for failure to comply may be a logical change. For instance, the
PTO could change the current fee regime. Currently, patent owners pay
maintenance fees to the PTO at 3.5, 7.5, and 11.5 years after they issue.
Annual fees may lessen the amount of frivolous litigation. The PTO could
place the annual fees towards the latter half of the patent term, like in Canada
and the United Kingdom. New features should be considered and studied for
the current administrative system.
In August of 2013 the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO)
assessed factors, mandated by Section 34 of the American Invents Act, which
may help improve patent quality.246 The GAO's mandate to assess these fac-
tors was due to "concerns that patent infringement litigation by [nonpractic-
ing entities] [was] increasing and that this litigation, in some cases, has
imposed high costs on firms that are actually developing and manufacturing
products."247 The GAO concluded that no such nonpracticing entity problem
241. Shawn Miller, Where's the Innovation? An Analysis of the Quantity and Quali-
ties of Anticipated and Obvious Patents (Feb. 10, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2029263.
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existed.248 The GAO, a nonpartisan agency under Congress, primarily used
data "compiled from Lex Machina, a firm specialized in collecting and ana-
lyzing IP litigation data."249
The GAO suggested that a focus on the type of patent may be more
important than the type of litigant.250 The GAO found software patent law-
suits accounted for approximately 89% of the increase in defendants from
2007 to 2011.251 More importantly, the assessment recognized a "valuable
opportunity to improve the quality of issued patents and the patent examina-
tion process and to further strengthen the U.S. patent system."252 Linking
internal data from the PTO examination process to litigation data may pro-
vide insight on patent quality.253 An objective, data-driven approach that ac-
curately reflects patent-related behavior is critical to optimizing the patent
system through legislation.254
V. CONCLUSION
Ample uncertainty in patent litigation accounts for many of the
problems in the patent system. The large number of patent cases brought by
practicing and nonpracticing entities has impacted the market so profoundly
that new patent legislation is inevitable. Many factors may explain the causes
of the current state of the U.S. patent system. Given the complexity and tech-
nical aspects of patent law, an easy fix is not an option. Although the number
of lawsuits by nonpracticing entities has risen, no single, exclusive explana-
tion for this phenomenon exists.255
Creating legislation to improve the patent system, where the range of
potential causes for inefficiencies is as expansive as the availability of ac-
tions, is troublesome. Several potential explanations for the current state of
the patent system include: nonpracticing entities asserting more frivolous
lawsuits; the PTO issued vaguely-worded, overly-broad patents in the 1990s
that are being enforced now; many patents were awarded in the e-commerce
and consumer-electronics field that are being asserted now; patents held by
nonpracticing entities are being infringed more often; nonpracticing entities
are buying patents that are already infringed; and inventors who did not have
an avenue to assert patent rights before, due to limited resources, are now
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using nonpracticing entities.256 Better data must be compiled before in-
formed, educated legislation is deployed.
Before major legislation is drafted, data should be compiled about the
relation between merits in a patent case to the settlement amounts, the length
of time specific patent cases last, and the amount of attorneys' fees in patent
cases.2 57 The Innovation Act of 2013 will not dramatically change the patent
system. Raising the pleading standard should help discourage frivolous pat-
ent suits, but will not stop the majority of patent suits. Patent litigation, like
all litigation, involves three types of cases: (1) clearly frivolous cases; (2)
clearly meritorious cases; and (3) cases in between.258 Clearly frivolous cases
must be stopped and laws must deter frivolous cases because they damage
the patent system.
Valid, reliable data, compiled by an objective third party, concerning
patent-related issues should be used to create legislation. Unfortunately, most
studies are funded by groups that have ulterior motives. Even the studies
within Section 8 of the Innovation Act are biased by ulterior motives. Gov-
ernment conducted studies are not entirely objective, even if the data used is
valid and reliable. The methodology and motives behind data must be under-
stood before patent reform actions are taken. Careful consideration of the
sources used to make patent legislation is imperative because the legislation
will affect the secondary patent market. Legislation that produces adverse
outcomes in the secondary patent market may weaken the patent system. A
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